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Redmount: It clearly comes up when tinue to get the idea across that the
the issue is the continuity of the rela- lawyer-client relationship has juristionship. When there is a long-term re- prudential significance, we might be
lationship, and time-consuming coun- able to take a second step and get
seling is involved-on an hourly basis, people to realize that the client is more
for example-the fee can become a dis- than a factor or a concept: he is also a
tracting and uncomfortable factor, es- human being.
pecially for a client who can't afford it.
Soderquist: Most lawyers would say
Brown: The fee is absolutely signifi- the object of what they do is to help
cant with respect to the commencement human beings. But they fail to underof a lawyer-client relationship, espe- stand they have to achieve that goal by
cially one that will require a good deal doing more than handling technical
of counseling. A lawyer ordinarily legal problems. This goes back to the
doesn't commence a client relation- traditional law-school teaching apship unless he envisions an adequate proach, in which legal questions are
fee. Sometimes he'll close his eyes to discussed vigorously and human needs
that, but on the whole he's got to be are considered very little. Law schools
relatively certain he will be well paid. If traditionally have done very little to
he can't be, in some situations, then the prepare lawyers for a counseling role. If
relationship doesn't even get started. a client needs counseling, for example,
That may be a frequent occurrence.
a divorce client who has a wide variety
Redmount: What impact does that of problems-legal, financial, and emohave on the image of a lawyer as a per- tional -the
skill the lawyer uses in
son available to help, or one who is helping with these problems is pretty
disposed to offer help? What does that much self-taught.
do in terms of his credibility as a helpBrown: That's so, but we need to difing person?
ferentiate counseling and therapy. Law
Soderquist: I suppose we can agree students and lawyers often do not make
that it doesn't do much for the lawyer's that distinction. In discussing the psyimage and credibility as someone dis- chological relationship between attorposed to help. But, focusing on legal ney and client in some of my classes,
counseling, perhaps that first question the reaction and discussion seem to
is: "How disposed are lawyers to turn to treating the client's mental conhelp?"
dition. I think lawyers also feel, some-

what, that if they were to get into serious legal counseling, they would be
getting into therapy.
I hope I am correct in observing that
Shaffer: There's the problem. Law- there is a real difference between counyers often aren't disposed to helpseling and therapy. I think lawyers
they aren't adequately concerned with ought to do counseling. I'm not sure
ministering to human beings. This can that we are competent to do therapy or
be traced to the law school dogma that ought to do it. The distinction may not
problems are more important than be a sharp one at times. No doubt a cerpeople. It is even prior to the lawyer's tain amount of counseling spills over
worries about making a living.
into some sort of therapy.
Brown: There's a lot in that. Law
Redmount: Let's not step in where
schools have not, until recently, even angels fear to tread. The issue of difregarded the client as a significant fac- ferentiating counseling from therapy is
tor within legal education. If we con- a conundrum that splits mental health
Lawyers' attitudes
about
legal counseling

professionals. Individuals have their
idiosyncratic views, but there is a lack
of consensus. The issue mainly seems
to turn on some concept of problem
severity and on how to distinguish procedures that deal with the different degrees of severity. The difficulty in understanding problems in counseling or
therapy is that they operate on a continuum of severity. There are not
"sane" or "insane" people, but people
with problems that, from a mental
health point of view, vary in degree of
intensity, complexity, solvability, and
so on. We are dealing with shadings
from the norm and not with an
"either-or."
When the lawyer seeks to "resolve"
the issue of counseling versus therapy,
his concern is not with a conceptual
understanding of problems and procedures. Rather it has to do with establishing the limits on his own feelings of
competence and with being assured
that he will not find himself in a psychological thicket. To this end, he may
develop some arbitrary differentiation
between counseling and therapy, but it
will be just that- arbitrary, and probably self-serving.
Shaffer: There are at least two separate areas of legal counseling, one relating to substantive and procedural law
-when the lawyer counsels the client
about what the law is and how to proceed-and the other relating to human
needs and human interactions. Let's
just focus on the latter, loosely defined,
without getting into a definitional
thicket. Law schools have certainly
done very little to prepare lawyers to be
counselors. And lawyers generally say
they aren't very good at it. But, in my
experience, lawyers' counsel is valuable nevertheless, and lawyers tend to
be pretty good at counseling.
Brown: Even without training, lawyers have tools that aren't available to
others and that can have significant
psychological effects. For example, in a

divorce situation, a lawyer may, rather
than proceed immediately to the task of
obtaining a divorce, discuss with the
client in great detail the practices, procedures, and consequences of divorce
from a legal point of view. He may do
this in the hope that reconciliation may
take place.
Soderquist: Carefully used, the technique of introducing a client to all the
ramifications of what he is contemplating can be effective. When used by a
lawyer who is insensitive to the client's
human needs, however, that technique
may be potent but bad; the lawyer may
use it to manipulate the client to do
what he thinks best for the client, rather
than using it to help the client make his
own choice. But, if lawyers basically
are good counselors, why don't they do
more of it?
Shaffer: Well, Harrop Freeman found
that lawyers are not likely to feel their
counseling time is as useful to clients
as time spent writing letters, pushing
people around, or looking up law. If
that's so, it means lawyers don't think
their counseling is as valuable as that of
psychologists, psychiatrists, clergymen, and physicians.
Brown: The point you make about
lawyers' inferiority complex ought to
be emphasized. A friend of mine, who
is a leading bankruptcy lawyer, once
told me that at current hourly rates,
there isn't time for "nonlegal" counseling. He then added that social workers
would probably do the job better.
Soderquist: I'm not sure lawyers
think counseling would not be as valuable to their clients as technical solutions to legal problems. I do believe
they don't think it's their job. When
speaking with a divorce client, for
example, a lawyer may say to himself,
"This one sure needs a shrink," and
then fail to see that it's part of his role to
do more than file the divorce papers
and do the best job he can in arguing for
more alimony.
The comments of your friend bring

something else to mind. He didn't say a
psychiatrist would probably do a better
job at counseling; he said a social
worker probably would. If lawyers believe they can't charge as much for
counseling as they can for other tasks,
they look for excuses to push it off on a
less highly-paid person. Along this
line, a minister friend has told me of his
anger at psychiatrists who take their
$50 an hour for conveniently scheduled
sessions and then, by being unavailable
to patients, leave the clergy to handle
psychiatric emergencies in the middle
of the night.
A couple of questions arise: First, if
lawyers change their approach to counseling and, as Shaffer says, "minister to
human beings," will the lawyer's job
take more time, and, if so, how much
more? Second, would clients be willing
to pay the extra fee?
Brown: If a lawyer counsels in an attempt to meet the human needs of his
client, he frequently believes, perhaps
wrongly, that the amount of time consumed in counseling will be lengthened. The idea behind this belief is that
it takes less time to tell a client what to
do than to arrive at a collaborative
course of action.
Shaffer: We don't know whether time
spent by lawyers increases or decreases
when a serious counseling approach is
taken. Some psychotherapy research
suggests that client-centered methods
take the least time. If one assumes that
the initial object in a psychologist's interview is to get the basic facts, it can be
demonstrated from tapes of sessions
that Carl Rogers got the facts more
quickly than the confrontive therapist,
Frederick Perls, or the rational-emotive
therapist, Albert Ellis. The same comparison may well hold true for the varying styles in legal counseling. Arguing
with clients-being a tyrant and crossexaminer
wastes a lot of time.
Redmount: I think you're on thin
ground in suggesting that personal attention to and exploration with the

client takes less time and gets to problems and problem resolution more
quickly. This is, from clinical observation, only occasionally the case. The rationale for taking time is not efficiency
but substantiality. Time well used
means that a more substantial and
meaningful service is provided, and
this both justifies the use of time and
warrants the extra expense. Many, if
not most, clients would agree. Those
who do not, or cannot afford this time,
can look to other alternatives. Educating the client may be a factor of some
importance. It, too, is a proper and
necessary function of legal counseling,
granting that this may or can come
close to proselytizing and be selfserving for the professional.
Soderquist: Many small-firm lawyers
seem almost to have a fetish about getting, as quickly as possible, the "facts
and nothing but the facts" needed to
handle a matter from a technical
standpoint. When I first encountered
this, I was impressed with the lawyer's
incisiveness; I've ceased to be impressed. I think big-firm lawyers are
more willing to hear clients out, but
often they don't see counseling as their
role and don't try to do it. In the latter
situation, time and expense are not so
often factors.
A lawyer doing the proper counseling job generally will spend more time
with clients. The important question is:
How much more total time would be
spent on a matter? I'm convinced not
much more would be spent if the lawyer were serious about counseling. I
have two reasons:
First, lawyers' "technical" work is
time-intensive, while the kind of counseling I foresee for lawyers is not. Even
a simple real estate sale matter, for
example, can take several hours. If a
lawyer is efficient with respect to time,
he could, for example, spend half an
hour with his client, just getting the
facts necessary for a technician's handling of the job and having the papers

signed, and five hours making up the
papers, reviewing another lawyer's
documents, writing letters, making and
answering telephone calls, and attending a closing. If the lawyer doubled the
time with his client, the total time of six
hours would only increase 11 per cent.
On matters taking more time for noncounseling work, the percentage of increase from spending more time with
clients obviously would be less. This
assumes, of course, that lawyers are not
likely to become involved in such pursuits as the kind of marriage counseling
done by marriage counselors, or any
sort of attempted psychotherapy. These
kinds of things would be time consuming, and I don't believe lawyers should
try them.
I'm thinking more of lawyers doing
such things as (a) evidencing a concern
for the human needs of clients; (b) attempting to help clients understand the
human aspects of their legal problems
and the ramifications in human terms
of their legal situation or a contemplated course of legal action; (c) using
counseling skills to find out what a
client really wants or needs, even if that
is hidden from the client, and helping
him understand his desires or needs;
and (d) spotting those clients who need
counseling help from other professionals. If what needs to be done in this area
will take very much time, it's almost
certain to be outside the lawyer's area
of competence.
Second, the practicalities of the lawyering situation would limit the percentage of time on a client's matter a
lawyer would spend counseling the
client. Clients realize appointments
with other clients must be kept. They
also realize lawyers can't devote more
than a certain amount of time to each
client. Let's say busy lawyers now
schedule half-hour appointments for
initial interviews. That probably makes
things too rushed and forces lawyers to
push aside human concerns in an attempt to get the facts out. Increasing the
initial appointment to one hour would
alleviate some of the time pressure. It
also would probably provide all the
time the client desired, or felt he could
expect, for the first visit. After that visit,
or perhaps one more, the lawyer would
probably begin his time-intensive legal
work, building a high ratio of nonclient
time to counseling time. The time spent
on the client's human needs should in
large measure be left up to the client,
with the client making the decisions
partly on the basis of whether he
wishes to pay for it.
912

Willingness of clients
to pay for
lawyers' counseling
Redmount: I see only Soderquist
suggesting that the client also may have
an opinion as to the amount of time and
the commensurate expense he is willing to underwrite in order to be helped.
There is a knowledgeable answer here,
and it comes from the most counseling-oriented of all counseling
enterprises, mental health. The client
frequently understands that time duration in counseling may be a matter of
considerable uncertainty, even assuming that both counselor and client are
committed to as expeditious a means of
problem solving as possible. The
client's needs typically are such that he
will grant all the time needed, and pay
for it, if he thinks he is being well-

served and benefits substantially. The
problem that may arise for the client is
that he cannot afford the best or the
most extended service, and this may set
time limits or suggest alternative procedures or alternative consultation
consistent with his ability to pay.
Shaffer: Every reliable study of what
clients seek from lawyers and what
they are willing to pay for, concludes
that effort is a more important factor
than results. People want lawyers who
really try and who care about them.
That seems obvious as a matter of reason, but it also seems clear as a matter
of fact or a matter of social science. If
that is so, and building on Soderquist's
guess that serious legal counseling will
increase costs by a factor of a small per
cent, then I am encouraged. There are
time and money enough for lawyers to
be good counselors, to make a living at
it, and to give better service to their
clients.
Brown: I wonder whether the way a
fee is set determines, in some measure,
the counseling given a client. While reliable studies show that clients regard
effort as more important than results,
contingent fees are determined solely
by results. It is probable that a large
portion of the fees paid by individual
clients to solo practitioners and smaller
offices are contingent fees. I wonder
what effect these fee arrangements have
on the counseling aspects of a lawyer's
activities. Also, most of these matters
are "single-shot," which do not contemplate repeat or long-range relationships with a client. Perhaps the client
regards the service as technical because
the entire fee is measured by technical
results. I think that studies of fees
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should try to determine the effect on
counseling of the manner in which fees
are determined.
Soderquist: What you say about contingent fee situations is true. There are,
of course, some cases in which clients
are hard pressed or unwilling to pay
more than a fair fee for technical legal
service, so that there would be no room
for a higher fee no matter what the lawyer did. But there are fewer of these
cases than lawyers believe. In many
cases, clients think fees are too high because they thought their problem was
simple, when in fact it was not or if it
was simple, it was time consuming.
Shaffer: We are beginning to find
that these clients can go to a "law
store" or impersonal legal clinic. I
think that's sad, though. What it may
mean is that other lawyers will find it
appropriate to give their clients more
personal attention.
Soderquist: I hope so, and I see no
reason to believe clients are not willing
to pay for counseling on the same basis
as other services. In fact, if the lawyer
did more counseling, he would probably make his total fee more palatable. I
base this on three things: first, the high
ratio of lawyers' time necessarily spent
on technical aspects of a problem in relation to time spent counseling; second,
the lack of appreciation of clients as to
how much time a lawyer spends away
from them working on their problems;
and third, the fact that satisfied clients
are more willing to pay high fees than
disgruntled ones.
There is also, of course, a more
straightforward reason to believe
clients would be willing to pay for lawyers' counseling. They know the lawyer
gets a fee for work he does for clients.
They also know there is usually a relationship between the time spent by the
lawyer and his fee. Clients also know
that other professionals charge for
counseling and at a high rate. There
may be a problem in getting clients to
sit still for enough counseling (and I
think they generally should decide
what is enough) because of their fear of
the fee, but I don't think they would
assume anything except that they
would pay for counseling on the same
basis as anything else a lawyer does.
The lawyer can do two things to get
clients to accept enough counseling: (1)
tell clients about the ratio of counseling
time to other time the lawyer will need
to spend on the matter (in effect, assure
them the fee won't be much higher),
and (2) tell them the counseling is
necessary when it is necessary. A

